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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
The Paris Agreement 2015 
Turning Point for the International Climate Regime 
In 2015 international climate negotiations were head-
ing for a new major step. After extensive preparation, 
the 195 member states of the Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed in December on 
how to deal with the challenges of post-2020 climate 
policy. These include climate protection (mitigation), 
adapting to climate change (adaptation), loss and 
damage caused by climate change, technology transfer 
and the financing of all necessary measures (climate 
finance). The 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) 
in the French capital adopted on 12th December a 
new “Paris Agreement” specifying climate policy tar-
gets and new processes to guarantee a broad partici-
pation of all parties. 
It took six years of negotiations after the first 
attempt to agree a post-Kyoto climate regime failed 
in Copenhagen in 2009. The Copenhagen summit 
achieved no more than sketching the outlines of a 
new agreement. The European Union and its member 
states insisted to retain the Kyoto Protocol model for 
a new regime. They were unprepared for the non-
binding pledge and review outcome (Copenhagen 
Accord), which was compatible with the interests of 
the United States, China and India. 
The new post-2020 regime will be measured not 
only by the effectiveness of mitigation efforts, but also 
by whether it enables comprehensive and sustainable 
climate risk management. What shape does the regime 
take? One important component is the contribution 
of emerging economies to climate protection, lifting 
the “firewall” between industrialised and developing 
countries that has guaranteed to the emerging econo-
mies that responsibility for climate action lies with 
the industrialised countries. Another component is to 
support economically weak parties through climate 
finance and capacity-building on the basis of reliable 
sources. At the same time the new climate regime has 
flexible components which enable the 196 parties to 
reconcile their interests with the demands of future 
climate change. 
Despite the high bar set in the run-up to Paris, there 
were good prospects of the 21st Conference of the Par-
ties (COP21) passing an agreement. Firstly, since 2013 
the United States has been working seriously to meet 
its own climate targets, and using bilateral channels 
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6 
to persuade China and India to engage more strongly 
in climate policy cooperation. Washington’s talks with 
Beijing in 2014 dissolved a long mutual blockade that 
had massively hindered international climate negotia-
tions. Also, German and EU efforts in the preparations 
for Paris have persuaded other industrialised and 
emerging economies, including Brazil, Canada and 
Japan, to promise support for long-term climate pro-
tection. 
Secondly, important elements of a new regime 
have already been established in the post-Copenhagen 
UNFCCC process. These include the Cancún Adapta-
tion Framework, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and 
the approach of voluntary contributions on the basis 
of national climate policies, rather than internationally 
negotiated burden-sharing. By December 2015 188 
parties had notified the UNFCCC Secretariat of their 
INDCs (Intended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions), which include emission reduction targets as 
well as adaptation measures in developing countries. 
The INDCs have evolved as a vehicle to enable broad 
participation in the new climate regime after 2020 
and are now incorporated in the Paris Agreement as 
NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions). 
Thirdly, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
wanted a comprehensive post-2020 climate regime 
to grant adaptation the same priority as climate pro-
tection and include adequate financial and technical 
support. Despite tight constraints on national budg-
ets, a positive trend emerged until 2015. Resources 
for climate financing have been growing since Copen-
hagen, the GCF started funding its first projects, and 
the Paris Agreement as well as the INDCs name actual 
adaptation needs. Long-term development strategies 
to address the growing challenges associated with 
climate change are still in their infancy. A series of 
technical questions must be examined in greater 
detail, both to clarify the various adaptation needs 
and to support those UNFCCC parties now agreeing 
to take mitigation action for the first time. 
The Paris Agreement is based on a consensus on 
all the core issues of post-2020 climate policy. It is, 
however, apparent that the regime will have to be 
developed further in 2016 and beyond. For example, 
the commitments announced in the INDCs have to 
be ratcheted up, as they are insufficient to achieve the 
two degree target sought for the end of the century. 
And the public/private post-2020 financial resources 
still have to be mobilised further in the donor coun-
tries. 
In order to deliver on the Paris Agreement’s climate 
policy agenda, the United States, China, India and 
the European Union, will above all have to bring their 
energy policy priorities in line with the global post-
2020 climate targets. Also, the European Union, the 
United States and other historical polluters will have 
to meet the demands for climate finance after 2020. 
For Germany and the European Union, there are many 
opportunities for cooperation with these major players. 
In view of the German energy transition (“Energie-
wende”) and European experience with climate policy, 
the emerging economies are certainly interested in 
such cooperation. Beijing intends to introduce a na-
tional emissions trading scheme as soon as 2017, for 
which it will require further support. Delhi will want 
to advance its expansion of both coal power and renew-
ables, and here too Germany can offer helpful input. 
Although the United States achieved key break-
throughs in the COP21 preparations, it is unlikely that 
it will continue to actively shape the UNFCCC’s cli-
mate agenda in 2016 (as an election year). The produc-
tive collaboration in 2015 between Washington’s 
external climate policy and the German G7 Presidency 
came to an end with the Paris summit. A continuation 
would be conceivable under the German G20 Presi-
dency in 2017 (following China in 2016). It would 
certainly offer opportunities to advance the climate 
agenda’s next steps jointly with the United States at 
the highest political level. 
The European Union, on the other hand, has to 
quickly conclude the legislative processes scheduled 
for 2016 to meet its 2030 climate target (at least 40 
percent lower emissions than in 1990). Germany should 
operate both as a supporter of reforms of EU emissions 
trading and energy legislation, and as a mediator 
between the western and eastern EU member states. 
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7 
Introduction: Reaching a New Climate Agreement in Paris 
 
High expectations were placed on the 2015 climate 
negotiations under the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They were to deliver an 
agreement which limits global warming and minimises 
the risks from climate change. Adapting to climate 
change was to be given equal priority to climate pro-
tection, and cooperation between developing, emerg-
ing and industrialised countries was to be placed on a 
new footing. The Paris climate talks in December 2015 
succeeded where Copenhagen failed in 2009: in con-
cluding a new and comprehensive global agreement 
under the UNFCCC. 
Some cornerstones of a new regime have already 
been agreed over the past six years, including retain-
ing the voluntary nature of national post-2020 miti-
gation measures, as introduced in Copenhagen. How-
ever, dimensions and processes of climate change 
are broader than that. Following Joyeeta Gupta, the 
challenges can be divided into various dimensions 
subject to influence by political action and societal 
change (see Fig. 1).1 This involves political actors as 
well as representatives from civil society – business, 
research and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Climate change is closely connected to systemic develop-
ments. Related national and international decisions 
influence climate change, for example pursuing sus-
tainable development with a focus on “green” growth. 
Economic and consumer policies affect patterns of 
production and consumption, trade flows and invest-
ment decisions, which all function as drivers of climate 
change. Moreover, climate policy is substantiated by 
the definition of rules and policy instruments, such as 
standards or pricing systems for emissions sources – like 
energy consumption or land use. Accumulated green-
house gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere can be removed 
by extending sinks (such as forests) or through tech-
nical interventions in the climate processes.2 A com-
prehensive climate policy has to also address the 
 
1  Joyeeta Gupta, The History of Global Climate Governance (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
2  The opportunities and risks of “climate engineering” are a 
divisive issue. See The Royal Society. Geoengineering the Climate: 
Science, Governance and Uncertainty (2009), https://royalsociety.org/ 
~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2009/ 
8693.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
Figure 1 
Processes and dimensions of climate change: 
political, economic and systemic influences 
* See http:/www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/about.htm. 
Source: based on Joyeeta Gupta, The History of Global Climate 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 24. 
Global and Regional Systemic Trends 
Sustainable/Non-sustainable Development,  
Green Economy, Inclusive Growth* 
Drivers of Climate Change 
Production, Consumption, Wealth Distribution, 
Trade, Investment, Demography 
Emission Sources 
Energy Consumption, Industrial Process,  
Transport, Buildings, Land Use 
Concentration of GHG in the Atmosphere 
Availablity of Sinks, Climate Engineering (Carbon 
Dioxide Removal), Natural Phenomena 
Global Warming 
Two Degrees Upper Limit, Climate Engineering 
(Solar Radiation Management) 
Direct Impacts from Climate Change 
Adaptation Measures and Capacities, Insurance, 
Loss and Damage 
Indirect Impacts from Climate Change 
Management of Resources, Health Risks, Supply 
Risks, Migration, Other Risks 
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direct and indirect consequences of climate change. 
These include adaptation measures at international 
and local level, dealing with irreversible loss and dam-
age caused by climate change, and addressing risks 
around security of supply ensuing from climate change. 
What Was Negotiated before and in Paris? 
The negotiations under the UNFCCC in Paris addressed 
three of the listed dimensions (grey in Fig. 1): emissions 
sources, GHG concentrations/sinks and direct impacts. 
The regime under the Kyoto Protocol (1997), which 
will last until 2020, focuses solely on emissions sources 
and sinks.3 During the negotiations in the 1990s the 
guiding principle was to develop through ongoing 
negotiations a global regime anchored in binding trea-
ties to limit the rise in global warming and stipulate 
what contribution each of the parties to the UNFCCC 
should make.4 Given the global character of climate 
change this is the first-best approach: the earth’s 
atmosphere is a global public good that should be pro-
tected through global action. However, cooperation 
between states and actors is ineffective without an 
institutional backing to ensure its bindingness. Each 
country tends to free-ride on the mitigation action 
undertaken by others and thus implements few of the 
agreed measures or none at all. This could be observed 
under the Kyoto regime. In particular, political and 
economic considerations made it difficult for many 
parties to comply with the obligations. It was part 
of the Paris negotiations to correct this poor perfor-
mance. 
The crux in Paris was to agree on a legally binding 
framework that not only enables effective climate 
protection from 2020 onwards, but enhances the im-
portance of adaptation, provides means for support-
ing developing countries’ adaptation and mitigation 
efforts, and also is perceived as fair by all 196 parties. 
 
3  The climate regime is understood here as an international 
regime that defines norm- and rule-based forms of coopera-
tion between states (and non-state actors included in the 
regime); the regime manifests itself as a complex of explicit 
and/or implicit principles, rules and decision-making pro-
cesses on which climate policy actors orientate their expec-
tations. See Stephen Krasner, “Structural Conflict: The Third 
World against Global Liberalism”, in International Regimes, ed. 
Stephen Krasner (Ithaca and London, 1983), 1–22. 
4  Oliver Geden, Modifying the 2°C Target: Climate Policy Objectives 
in the Contested Terrain of Scientific Policy Advice, Political Prefer-
ences, and Rising Emissions, SWP Research Paper 5/2013 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2013). 
For this the INDCs were a key component. They 
needed to be included in a way that is as binding as 
possible, prescribes a regular increase in ambitions, 
but avoids a prescriptive character. High demands 
were placed on incorporating adaptation as an equally 
important issue as mitigation, because related finan-
cial obligations were needed to increase substantially 
over time.5 
The negotiations were thus aiming at a new way of 
incorporating the overarching principle of Common 
but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capa-
bilities (CBDR&RC) which has been at the heart of the 
climate regime since the founding of the UNFCCC in 
1992. In line with that, the solutions negotiated in Paris 
needed to be generally regarded as equitable. The par-
ticular importance of this principle was clear, while 
the way in which tribute was going to be paid to it was 
not. Differentiation along the CBDR&RC demands that 
the regime takes into account each country’s economic 
strength and historical contribution to climate change 
as well as its contributions and its needs for support 
for future efforts in mitigation and adaptation. Cli-
mate finance (for a definition see below, p. 27) and 
technology transfer serve as instruments to balance 
interests and incentives for deeper cooperation; and 
as such they also contribute to fulfilling the CBDR&RC 
principle. Ultimately, the Paris Agreement text in-
cludes references to differentiation in all key articles 
(see “The Paris Climate Summit 2015”, pp. 23ff.). 
Another element was the transparency of the new 
regime which relates to all processes, in particular to 
the accounting and reporting duties of the parties. 
As the developing countries are newcomers in submit-
ting targets on protecting the climate, and as many 
INDCs formulate mitigation and adaptation in a con-
ditional way – by connecting activities to financial 
and other support – the Paris Agreement needed to in-
clude standardised accounting and review procedures. 
After the Copenhagen summit the UNFCCC nego-
tiations have suffered harsh criticism, with a compre-
hensive solution to climate change apparently no-
where in sight. However, many climate initiatives and 
measures – not least initiated by the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol – have emerged at national, regional 
and local level, driven by state and non-state actors, 
for example in the form of civil society and entrepre-
 
5  UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Proposal by the 
President, Draft Decision 12 December 2015, https://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf (accessed 8 Janu-
ary 2016). 
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9 
neurial initiatives or alliances of cities. In Paris there 
were attempts to connect these diverse subnational 
and transnational activities with the global regime.6 
Which Achievements Were Needed in Paris? 
The 2015 climate talks were pursuing the goal of 
establishing a binding global post-2020 framework 
for a comprehensive climate policy and a consensus 
among all 195 participating states. Regardless of its 
substance or degree of obligation, this consensus al-
ready represents a diplomatic breakthrough, given 
that during the 2015 preparations for COP21 the inter-
ests of the parties were considerably apart on a num-
ber of details. 
Moreover, the new agreement needed to firstly, 
demonstrate ways to coordinate national climate 
action and align them with the long-term objective of 
limiting greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to meet 
the two degree target. That means supplying informa-
tion, verifying the achieved emission reductions and 
revising them over time, and it means that the par-
ticipation of as many countries as possible had to be 
secured. 
Analyses by Climate Action Tracker in October 2015 
showed that the INDCs would limit warming to an aver-
age of 2.7 degrees Celsius by the end of the century.7 
Estimates by the UNFCCC Secretariat put the figure at 
3.3 degrees. As the analyses showed that on the basis 
of the INDCs submitted thus far growth in emissions 
would slow by 2030 but certainly not by enough to 
reverse the global emissions trend (Fig. 2, p. 10), it was 
crucial for COP21 to find a dynamic solution for scaling 
up the INDCs.8 
Secondly, the agreement was supposed to assign 
and distribute the risks associated with climate policy 
and with accelerating climate change. This required 
consensus on adaptation measures, recognition of loss 
 
6  Michele Betsill, Navroz K. Dubash, Matthew Paterson, Harro 
van Asselt, Antto Vihma and Harald Winkler, “Building Pro-
ductive Links between the UNFCCC and the Broader Global 
Climate Governance Landscape”, Global Environmental Politics 
15, no. 2 (May 2015): 1–10. 
7  Climate Action Tracker, Tracking INDCs, as of 23 October 
2015, http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html (accessed 
27 October 2015). 
8  United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC), Synthesis 
Report on the Aggregate Effect of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs), 30 October 2015, 10ff., http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf (accessed 6 November 
2015). INDCs submitted up to 1 October 2015 were analysed. 
and damage, and above all provision of support 
(finance and technology). 
In particular, agreement had to be achieved on 
future climate finance. The COP in Cancún 2010 
already decided to provide the developing countries 
with US$100 billion annually until 2020; by 2014 
existing financial sources totalled some US$61 billion 
(see “Financing Climate Policy”, pp. 27f.). A successful 
deal in Paris was dependent on ensuring climate 
finance after 2020. 
The Paris COP21 was part of a broader UN agenda 
in 2015. The adoption of the 17 SDGs on 25 September 
2015 created a new basis for cooperation between in-
dustrial, emerging and developing countries tackling 
global challenges. In the SDGs, all members of the 
UN have signed up to make their own contributions 
to fighting poverty, conserving resources and the 
environment, and shaping sustainable development 
paths. The Paris Agreement was expected to achieve a 
similar breakthrough by broadening the participation 
of countries in taking climate action and addressing 
the full scope of climate change related issues. Cir-
cumstances for COP21, however, were difficult as the 
EU was affected by internal crises and rising security 
concerns caused by conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine.9 
Germany’s Role 
Germany’s share of global GHG emissions is small, 
amounting to 2.4 percent in 2012 (see Table 1, p. 11, 
value for 2012). However, there are various respects in 
which the German economy and policy are significant 
for the development of global emissions, also beyond 
its national borders. On the one hand, German exports 
of efficient technologies and innovative processes, 
political instruments and sectoral initiatives (such as 
the energy transition) create so-called spillover effects 
that improve climate protection in other countries. 
On the other hand, Germany’s globalised economy 
also causes emissions abroad, when households and 
businesses import goods and services. These emissions, 
however, do not enter Germany’s emissions data. The 
 
9  Clearly, the terrorist attacks of 13th November 2015 in 
Paris had placed a severe constraint on the French govern-
ment. It had to organise and secure the leaders’ event on the 
30th November with more than 150 heads of state and gov-
ernments attending COP21, and two weeks with more than 
45,000 participants. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/cop21 
parisinformationhub/cop-21cmp-11-information-hub-leaders-
and-high-level-segment/ (accessed 21 January 2016). 
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Figure 2 
Slowing of growth in emissions on basis of INDCs submitted by 1 October 2015 (147 parties) 
Source: UNFCC, Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), October 2015, 2, 
http://unfccc.int/files/focus/indc_portal/application/pdf/synthesis_report_-_brief_overview.pdf (accessed 10 November 2015). 
 
German climate target of reducing CO2 emissions by 
40 percent by 2020 (compared to the figure for 1990) 
refers only to emissions released from German terri-
tory, and takes no account of emissions effects gener-
ated internationally or at EU level. For achieving the 
German target European policies and measures play a 
key role, because more than 40 percent of the German 
CO2 emissions are regulated by the European emissions 
trading system (EU ETS). A reduction in emissions from 
industry or electricity generation in Germany has no 
effect on the total balance of European Union emis-
sions in these sectors. Thus, Germany cannot speed up 
emissions reductions effectively without a correspond-
ing strengthening of the EU climate agenda. In order 
to follow up on the Paris Agreement, it will be impor-
tant to follow up on both the national and the EU 
policy level. 
In preparing for the Paris negotiations, the German 
government was able to make productive use of its G7 
Presidency in 2015. In June at the G7 Summit in Elmau, 
Bavaria, the reticent partners Canada and Japan were 
persuaded to agree to a long-term objective of decarbo-
nisation by the middle of the century, meaning above 
all phasing out of fossil fuels.10 G7 activities and the 
bilateral talks the U.S. government has been conduct-
ing with China and India since 2014, adding to a 
cooperative spirit in the climate negotiations and 
bringing on board the major emerging economies. If 
 
10  G7 Germany, Think Ahead: Act Together, Leaders Declaration, 
G7 Summit, 7–8 June 2015, Schloss Elmau, 16–18, https:// 
www.g7germany.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G8_G20/2015-06-
08-g7-abschluss-eng.html (accessed 28 October 2015). 
the new climate regime established by the Paris Agree-
ment is to be strengthened and its targets are to be 
met, cooperation with the major players must con-
tinue and deepen from 2016 onwards. 
 
This research paper examines the climate policy inter-
ests of the European Union, the United States, China, 
and India as they emerged before the COP21. It looks 
into the way in which economic and energy trends have 
contributed to the climate policy interests of each of 
these players at the national and international level 
and their role in preparing the Paris Agreement. Oppor-
tunities for future climate cooperation are identified. 
The research paper also elaborates the principles and 
elements of the climate regime, including the UNFCCC, 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, and con-
cludes with an outlook to 2016 and the role of Germa-
ny and the European Union in the ongoing UNFCCC 
process. 
 
 
 
 
growth rate 1990–2010 
extended growth rate  
2010–2030 
estimated growth rate with 
INDCs 2010–2030 (median and 
range) 
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Table 1 
GHG emissions of G20 states in 2005 and 2012 (Mt) and share of global total (%) 
Ranking GHG emissions 
2005 (in Mt) 
Share (%)  Ranking GHG emissions 
2012 (in Mt) 
Share (%) 
1 China  7,345.03  18.9  1 China  10,975.50  24.5 
2 United States  6,841.50  17.6 2 United States  6,235.10  13.9 
3 European Union  4,953.34  12.8 3 European Union  4,399.15  9.8 
4 Russia  2,141.35  5.5 4 India  3,013.77  6.7 
5 India  2,081.93  5.4 5 Russia  2,322.22  5.2 
6 Japan  1,336.84  3.4 6 Japan  1,344.58  3.0 
7 Germany  940.59  2.4 7 Brazil*  1,012.55  2.3 
8 Brazil  840.19  2.2 8 Germany  887.22  2.0 
9 Canada  722.57  1.9 9 Indonesia*  760.81  1.7 
10 Mexico  656.93  1.7 10 Mexico  723.85  1.6 
11 UK  636.75  1.6 11 Canada  714.12  1.6 
12 Indonesia  626.62  1.6 12 South Korea  693.33  1.5 
13 Italy  563.39  1.5 13 Australia  648.23  1.4 
14 South Korea  559.27  1.4 14 UK  553.43  1.2 
15 Australia  558.84  1.4 15 Italy  465.20  1.0 
16 France  515.98  1.3 16 South Africa  462.60  1.0 
17 South Africa  407.72  1.1 17 France  457.34  1.0 
18 Saudi Arabia  352.08  0.9 18 Turkey  419.70  0.9 
19 Argentina  328.34  0.8 19 Saudi Arabia  352.08  0.8 
20 Turkey  319.47  0.8 20 Argentina  338.00  0.8 
Total  32,728.73  84.4  Total  36,778.78  82.1 
G20 total  
(without D, F, I, UK) 
 30,072.02  77.5  G20 total  
(without D, F, I, UK) 
 34,415.59  76.8 
Rest of world  8,709.91  22.5  Rest of world  10,399.95  23.2 
GHG global total  38,781.93  100.0  GHG global total  44,815.54  100.0 
*  In ten of the G20 states the inclusion of land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) changes emissions. According to  
CAIT the countries whose share of global GHGs would increase most if land use, land use change and forestry were included  
are Brazil (from 2.3 to 3.8 percent in 2012) and Indonesia (from 1.7 to 4.2 percent in 2012). 
Source: Own calculations; data from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2015), 
http://cait.wri.org (accessed 22 June 2015). Without land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
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Between Summits: 
Climate Policy Exposed to Economic and Energy Trends 
 
Since their early days the climate negotiations have 
been dominated by international trends that restrict 
or expand the options of individual states to act on 
mitigation and adaptation. Again, after the Copenha-
gen summit of 2009, the heads of state and govern-
ment engaged actively in advance of the Paris COP21 
and once more this summit was regarded in public as 
the last chance to fix the problem. Between these two 
COPs, however, the actual implementation of climate 
policy was heavily influenced by short-term economic 
and energy trends, which continue to play a central 
role in national climate and energy politics. 
In particular national developments in the energy 
markets have driven the climate policies of individual 
states. The shale gas revolution in the United States, in 
the course of which U.S. CO2 emissions fell, represents 
a prime example, as does air pollution in Chinese 
cities caused by coal-burning, or the German energy 
transition. 
Crisis Reins in the Pioneer 
The economic and financial crisis significantly 
affected the 2009 climate talks and the ensuing phase. 
The Lehman bankruptcy at the end of 2008 triggered 
an international financial crisis, followed in the sub-
sequent year by a collapse in the real economy. All 
economies integrated into the international capital 
and goods markets were badly affected.11 
The biggest economic powers, which are at the 
same time the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases 
(see Table 1), established the G20 to discuss how to 
regulate the international financial markets. Many 
states launched economic stimulus packages, some 
with a “green” focus on environmentally- and climate-
friendly investment.12 
 
11  Hanns Günther Hilpert and Stormy-Annika Mildner (eds.), 
The Financial Crisis: Collateral Damage and Responses, SWP Research 
Paper 6/2009 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 
2009). 
12  The states have announced a total volume of up to US$2.8 
trillion. See Susanne Dröge, “Climate Policy and Economic 
Bust: The European Challenges to Create Green Stimulus”, in 
Carbon and Climate Law Review 3, no. 2 (February 2009): 135–42. 
However, political interest in climate change issues 
collapsed. International climate policy, which until 
the Copenhagen summit had been pushed at the 
highest policy level, fell back into the responsibility 
of the ministers for the environment or other depart-
ments. And while the financial crisis of 2009 came at 
the worst possible moment for Copenhagen’s expan-
sion of climate financing under UNFCCC Article 11 
(see “Financing Climate Policy”, pp. 27f.), it was at 
least possible for OECD countries to pledge US$30 bil-
lion in “fast start finance” for 2010–2012. 
From 2007 the EU adopted the role of driving force 
and pioneer of global climate action by setting up a 
climate and energy package including the EU’s 2020 
climate target for the new global agreement, and by 
pushing for a successful Copenhagen summit. After 
the Copenhagen conference failed in delivering on the 
EU’s ambitions, the European Commission neverthe-
less sought to persuade the member states to increase 
the EU’s emission reduction target for 2020 from 20 to 
30 percent, although this was intended only in case of 
other major players such as the United States taking 
comparable efforts (conditional target).13 
Tensions over climate and energy policy have grown 
between the eastern and western member states, with 
the eastern states no longer willing to go along with 
the Commission’s ambitious agenda in the way they 
did before Copenhagen.14 Also in view of the urgency 
of the EU debt crisis, the 30-percent target never made 
it onto the agenda of an EU Council summit. After all, 
the EU 2020 target which was taken up for the second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2012, 
Doha Amendment), remained a 20 percent reduc-
 
13  Oliver Geden and Severin Fischer, Moving Targets: Negotia-
tions on the EU’s Energy and Climate Policy Objectives for the Post-
2020 Period and Implications for the German Energy Transition, SWP 
Research Paper 3/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Poli-
tik, March 2014); European Commission, Analysis of Options to 
Move beyond 20% Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions and Assessing the 
Risk of Carbon Leakage, COM(2010) 265 final, Brussels, 26 May 2010. 
14  Susanne Dröge and Oliver Geden, The EU and the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement: Ambitions, Strategic Goals, and Tactical Approaches, 
SWP Comments 29/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 2015), http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/ 
swp-comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/the_eu_and_ 
the_paris_climate_agreement.html (accessed 28 October 2015). 
Energy Trends: Coal Consumption, Shale Gas and Energy Transition 
SWP Berlin 
The Paris Agreement 2015:  
Turning Point for the International Climate Regime 
February 2016 
 
 
13 
tion.15 The debate within the European Union sub-
sequently turned to the definition of a new mitigation 
target for 2030,16 which was notified as its INDC in 
the UNFCCC process (see “The Paris Climate Summit”, 
pp. 23ff.). 
Energy Trends: Coal Consumption, Shale Gas 
and Energy Transition 
Global greenhouse gas emissions have increased 
sharply since the 1990s.17 According to the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), energy 
supply and industry are largely responsible for the 
growth in emissions, contributing 77 percent of the 
dynamic increase over the past decade (2000–2010), 
followed by transport (11 percent) and buildings 
(3 percent).18 This development takes the opposite 
direction to the reversal of the global emissions trend 
that the IPCC insists is required by 2020.19 
Over the past fifteen years it is the consumption 
of coal that has increased most, with its share in the 
global energy mix rising from 23 percent in 2000 
to 29 percent by 2014.20 The IPCC’s fifth assessment 
report points out that the growing use of coal in the 
industrialised and emerging economies has not only 
stopped but in fact reversed the decarbonisation trend 
 
15  European Commission, Kyoto 2nd Commitment Period (2013–
20), http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/progress/ 
kyoto_2/index_en.htm (accessed 28 October 2015). 
16  Geden and Fischer, Moving Targets (see note 13). 
17  According to the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) 
global GHG emissions in 2012 were about 46 Gt, including 
land use, land use change and forestry; the figure for 1990 
was about 32 Gt. In the decade from 2000 to 2010 annual 
global GHG emissions rose from 35.5 Gt to 44.2 Gt. See CAIT, 
Climate Data Explorer, Historical Emissions, http://cait.wri.org/ 
historical/Country%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator[]=Total 
GHG Emissions Excluding Land-Use Change and Forestry& 
indicator[]=Total GHG Emissions Including Land-Use, Land-
Use Change and Forestry&year[]= 2012&chartType=geo 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
18  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Sum-
mary for Policymakers: IPCC WG III Report, 2014, 7–8, http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg3/ipcc_wg3_ar5_ 
summary-for-policymakers.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
19  In order to meet the global two degree target, global 
emissions would have to fall by up to 95 percent by 2050. 
IPCC, Fifth Assessment Report: Summary for Policy Makers (Cam-
bridge and New York, 2013). 
20  International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 
2015: Executive Summary (Paris, 2015), 5, https://www.iea.org/ 
Textbase/npsum/WEO2015SUM.pdf (accessed 10 November 
2015). 
– and the associated decline in the CO2 intensity of 
global energy production that had begun in the past 
decade. If demand for energy continues to increase in 
response to population growth and economic growth, 
use of coal could contribute to a steady increase in 
global CO2 emissions.21 The IPCC forecasts that in 2050 
up to 42 Gt CO2 annually could be emitted by the ener-
gy supply sector alone (compared to 14.4 Gt CO2 in 
2010). That is equivalent to the entire global emissions 
volume for 2008.22 India and China are the main 
drivers of this development. However, in 2015 the coal 
trend paused. In view of the uncertainties in the 
global energy market, the latest World Energy Outlook by 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that by 
2040 coal will play a lesser role in China and decline 
sharply in the European Union.23 
On the demand side the curve is also flattening. 
In 2014, according to the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2015, the rise in global energy consumption 
(plus 0.9 percent) slowed for the first time since 2009. 
Factors contributing to this drop – from plus 2 percent 
in 2013 – include a strong decline in energy consump-
tion in the European Union (–3.9 percent) and in Japan 
(–3.0 percent), growth of 1.2 percent in the United 
States and 2.6 percent in China, and a new peak of 
7.1 percent in India.24 
China’s Energy Future Determines 
Global Emissions … 
No other single country has as great an influence on 
climate change as the People’s Republic of China. Its 
share of global greenhouse gas emissions has increased 
from 18.9 percent in 2005 to 24.5 percent in 2012, and 
now exceeds the sum of U.S. and EU emissions (see 
Figs 3 and 4). While China’s per-capita GHG emissions 
were still roughly in line with the world average in 
2005 (about 5.6 tonnes), by 2012 the figure had risen 
to 8.1 tonnes, well above that average (see Fig. 6, p. 17). 
The increase can be attributed largely to emissions 
from power generation (coal), energy-intensive indus-
tries (cement and steel) and transport. At the same 
time China is the world leader in investment in renew-
 
21  IPCC, Summary for Policymakers (see note 18), 8. 
22  IPCC, Technical Summary, IPCC WG III, 2014, 69. 
23  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2015 (see note 20). 
24  British Petroleum (BP), Statistical Review of World Energy 
2015, http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-country/de_de/PDFs/ 
brochures/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-
report.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
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ables; in 2014 almost half of all global investment in 
wind and solar power occurred in China. 
Compatibility of economic growth with environ-
mental protection has high priority for Beijing, espe-
cially with air pollution in the urban areas reaching 
critical levels.25 Since the 11th five-year plan (2006 to 
2010) Beijing has been making an effort at climate pro-
tection. The current 12th five-year plan (2011–2015) 
defines targets for reducing energy and emissions in-
tensity (by 16 and 17 percent per unit of GDP respec-
tively) and for increasing the share of renewables (to 
11.4 percent compared to 8.3 percent in 2010).26 
China’s economic growth will slow in the coming 
years (7.9 percent was achieved in 2014; growth in 
2015 was 6.9, very close to the planned 7 percent),27 
meaning that emissions will also increase less. The 
result of initial efforts to improve efficiency is very 
positive. From 2005 to 2013 the Chinese economy 
grew at an annual average of 10 percent, its energy 
consumption by just 6 percent. During the same 
period energy intensity fell by about 26 percent, thus 
the rising trend of earlier years was stopped. However 
the success of short-term measures – for example coal 
consumption falling by 7 percent in 2014 compared 
to 2013 – could be misleading as achieving further 
drastic emissions reductions will be difficult. Coal still 
accounted for 68.5 percent of China’s primary energy 
consumption in 2013, and continues to supply the 
lion’s share of power generation. Considerable in-
creases in large power stations’ efficiency since 2005 
and the successful reduction in energy intensity in 
manufacturing resulted from both low-hanging fruit 
in terms of efficiency and the closure of highly emis-
sion-intensive installations.28 Analysts therefore assume 
 
25  Tania Branigan, “Chinese Premier Declares War on Pollu-
tion in Economic Overhaul”, Guardian, 5 March 2014, http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/china-pollution-
economic-reform-growth-target (accessed 28 October 2015); 
Susanne Dröge and Gudrun Wacker, China’s Approach to Inter-
national Climate Policy: Change Begins at Home, SWP Comments 
40/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 
2014). 
26  Can Wang, Wenjia Cai, Hua Liao and Jie Lin, “China’s Car-
bon Mitigation Strategies: Enough?” Energy Policy 73 (October 
2014): 47–56. 
27  See the figures published in March 2015: “The Economy: 
Bad Beginnings”, Economist, 14 March 2015, 52. A sharp fall 
was reported at the end of August; see “Taking a Tumble: 
Briefing: China and the World Economy”, Economist, 29 
August 2015, 18. 
28  The yield rose from 41.3 to 75.6 percent. See BP Statistical 
Review, cited in Wang et al., “China’s Carbon Mitigation 
Strategies” (see note 26), 53. 
that the trends for industrial emissions, energy sav-
ings and efficiency improvements in power generation 
will flatten off.29 If emissions are to be decisively cur-
tailed there will also have to be incisive industrial 
reforms and an expansion of the catalogue of political 
interventions on consumption. 
Chinese energy prices are a critical point, too. The 
energy companies are still state-controlled and prices 
do not reflect market interactions; additionally energy 
sector reforms have been slow. As a first move towards 
market-based pricing, China is testing emissions trad-
ing in selected provinces, with seven pilot projects 
targeting above all the most energy-intensive com-
panies. In 2015 China announced in the context of the 
UNFCCC negotiations that it will start national emis-
sions trading in 2017. In view of the delays experi-
enced in the test phase, this target seems rather over-
ambitious and analysts assume a fully-fledged system 
will not be running before 2020 at the earliest.30 
In any case, given the number of plants and emis-
sions covered a national cap and trade system will 
automatically have an impact on China’s emissions 
path and international climate policy: If emissions 
trading in China was fully operational, costs would 
rise for companies with inefficient installations, 
and the international competitiveness of emission-
intensive Chinese production would decrease. In the 
longer run this could in fact create benefits for the 
Chinese economy: Increasing costs in energy- and 
emissions-intensive sectors will stimulate modernisa-
tion, efficiency and the search for alternatives.31 China 
has repeatedly declared that it wants to encourage 
production of high-value products for the world mar-
ket and to reduce heavy industry’s share of GDP in 
favour of services. 
 
29  Wang et al., “China’s Carbon Mitigation Strategies” 
(see note 26), 51 and 52. 
30  “Doubt Cast over Start of China Emissions Trading 
Scheme”, Financial Times, 28 September 2015, http://www.ft. 
com/intl/cms/s/0/ff2f22fc-65ba-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.html 
#axzz3pBqoAQQ1 (accessed 28 October 2015); Megan Darby, 
“Low prices raise concerns for China carbon market”, Climate 
Home, http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/01/29/low-
prices-raise-concerns-for-china-carbon-market/ (accessed 29 
January 2016). 
31  Thomas Spencer, Roberta Pierfederici et al., Beyond the 
Numbers: Understanding the Transformation Induced by INDCs: 
A Project of the MILES Project Consortium, Study 5/2015 (Paris: 
Institut du développement durable et des relations inter-
nationales [IDDRI], 15 October 2015), http://www.iddri.org/ 
Publications/Collections/Analyses/MILES%20report.pdf 
(accessed 6 November 2015). 
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Figure 3 Figure 4 
Share of global GHG emissions in 2005 (%) Share of global GHG emissions in 2012 (%) 
Source for Figs 3 and 4: Own calculations; data from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) (Washington, D.C.: World Resources 
Institute, 2015), http://cait.wri.org (accessed 22 November 2015). 
 
… As Will India’s Growing Demand for Energy 
India takes place number four in the ranking of global 
greenhouse gas emitters, behind China, the United 
States and the European Union, and could move up 
the list even further in the coming years (see Figs 3 
and 4). 
The Indian government under Narendra Modi is 
prioritising economic development and pressing 
forward with industrialisation, promoting foreign 
direct investment and accelerating technology trans-
fer. Its aim is above all to bring economic growth, 
which was about 5 percent in 2014, back up to an 
annual rate of 7 or 8 percent.32 Alongside the liberali-
sation and opening of India’s markets, improving the 
energy supply will be a crucial precondition for such 
an upturn.33 
 
32  “India’s Growth Rate Set to Surpass China this Year: 
World Bank”, Economic Times, 11 November 2015, http:// 
economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/ 
indias-growth-rate-set-to-surpass-china-this-year-world-bank/ 
articleshow/47621953.cms (abgerufen 28 October 2015). 
33  Piyush Pandey, “China to Invest $100 Billion in India 
over 5 Years”, Times of India, 13 September 2014, http:// 
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/China-
to-invest-100-billion-in-India-over-5-years/articleshow/ 
42386772.cms (accessed 28 October 2015). 
The Indian energy market is, however, character-
ised by fragmentation and confusion of responsibili-
ties over which central and state governments com-
pete. A shortage of generating capacity and the lack 
of reliable energy infrastructure mean that the Indian 
authorities have difficulty guaranteeing adequate elec-
tricity supply to major industrial facilities. 
In order to satisfy the rapidly growing demand for 
electricity, the Modi government is pursuing the ex-
pansion of renewables, alongside the use of coal. In 
September 2015 the Indian cabinet decided – with 
an eye to the Paris COP21 – to expand solar and wind 
capacity by 350 GW over the next fifteen years. In its 
INDCs India sets a target of producing 40 percent of 
its electricity from renewables by 2030.34 
 
34  “India to Set 35% Carbon Intensity Reduction Target by 
2020 – Media”, Carbon Pulse, 22 September 2015, http://carbon-
pulse.com/india-to-set-35-carbon-intensity-reduction-target-by-
2030-media/ (accessed 28 October 2015); UNFCCC, INDCs as 
Communicated by Parties, as of 28 October 2015, http://www4. 
unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.
aspx (accessed 28 Oc”tober 2015). 
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Figure 5 
Cumulative GHG emissions 1850 to 2012  
(Mt, country shares in %) 
Source: Own calculations; data from Climate Analysis Indicators 
Tool (CAIT) (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2015), 
http://cait.wri.org (accessed 22 November 2015). Without land 
use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
Energy Transition Made in the U.S. 
The U.S. energy supply has witnessed fundamental 
change since 2009 through the rise of shale gas pro-
duction and its growing share of energy consump-
tion.35 In 2011 U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases 
were 6.9 percent lower than in 2005, also due to the 
economic crisis. However, according to the UNFCCC 
emissions in 2011 were 8 percent above the Kyoto base 
year of 1990.36 Emissions from the energy and 
transport sector declined again in 2012, falling by a 
further 3.4 percent according to the U.S. Environmen-
 
35  Shale gas production increased tenfold between 2005 
and 2012. Susanne Dröge and Kirsten Westphal, Shale Gas for 
a Better Climate? The US Fracking Revolution Challenges European 
and International Climate Policy, SWP Comments 25/2013 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2013), 2. 
36  UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Thirty-
ninth Session, Warsaw, 11–16 November 2013, Item 3(b) of 
the provisional agenda. National communications and greenhouse 
gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Conven-
tion. Report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties 
included in Annex I to the Convention for the period 1990–2011. 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990–2011, 
FCCC/SBI/2013/19 (Warsaw 2013), Tab. 5, 14, http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2013/sbi/eng/19.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
tal Protection Agency (EPA).37 Under the Copenhagen 
Accord of 2009 the United States agreed to reduce its 
GHG emissions voluntarily by 17 percent by 2020 
(compared to 2005). That target is thus within reach.38 
The key drivers of the shale gas (and shale oil) revo-
lution were advances in extraction technology and a 
market environment characterised by favourable politi-
cal and legal circumstances offering the necessary 
investment security, a developed infrastructure and 
gas market, the proximity to consumers, and not least 
the U.S.-specific land ownership rights.39 
However, unlike the German energy transition this 
development is not based on any long-discussed con-
cept, or on a vision of greening energy sources. Instead 
it stems above all from Washington pursuing greater 
independence from imported oil and gas. Under the 
Obama administration, Washington has explicitly 
turned attention to promoting clean energy and im-
proving energy efficiency. As well as natural gas, the 
share of nuclear in the energy mix is to increase; coal-
fired power plants are to be equipped with CCS (car-
bon capture and sequestration) and energy efficiency 
massively improved, including in buildings, in the 
transport sector and in product standards.40 
The U.S. production of unconventional gas has 
worldwide repercussions via the energy markets. 
The rapid U.S. switch to gas for electricity generation 
was – besides the impact on oil markets – especially 
important, with a drop of about 12 percent in domes-
tic coal consumption in 2012. U.S. coal production fell 
by only 7.5 percent and the rest was exported.41 This 
has contributed to the international rise of coal use 
and falling coal prices. 
 
37  Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Green-
house Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2012. Executive Summary 
(Washington, D.C. 2014), 4, http://epa.gov/climatechange/ 
Downloads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2014-Chapter-
Executive-Summary.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
38  According to the World Resources Institute (WRI) the 
present legal basis is sufficient to expand climate protection, 
but achieving the 2020 target would require additional regu-
latory efforts. See Nicholas M. Bianco, Franz T. Litz, Kristin I. 
Meek and Rebecca Gasper, Can the U.S. Get There from Here? Using 
Existing Federal Laws and State Action to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions: Summary for Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: WRI, 2013). 
39  Dröge and Westphal, Shale Gas for a Better Climate? 
(see note 35), 5. 
40  White House, The President’s Climate Action Plan 2013 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (accessed 28 
October 2015). 
41  Ibid., 6. 
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Figure 6 
Per-capita GHG emissions in 2005 and 2012 (t) 
Source: Own calculations; data from Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2015), 
http://cait.wri.org (accessed 22 November 2015). 
 
The shale gas revolution has attracted the attention 
of energy policymakers worldwide. First, because this 
kind of gas extraction would also be possible in other 
parts of the world and raised hopes of increasing ener-
gy security.42 Second, a low domestic U.S. gas price has 
negative implications for the competitiveness of non-
U.S. energy-intensive companies, and in Germany and 
other EU countries this intensified the debate whether 
climate action is compatible with national economic 
interests. 
Energy Transition Made in Germany 
Although the German energy transition (“Energie-
wende”) of 2011 was labelled as climate policy project, 
the specific trigger was the Japanese nuclear disaster 
at Fukushima on 12 March 2011. Accordingly, the 
phase-out of nuclear energy production was the im-
mediate first step. The longer-term goal of the energy 
transition is to improve energy efficiency and expand 
 
42  US Energy Information Administration, Technically Recover-
able Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale 
Formations in 41 Countries outside the United States (Washington, 
D.C., 2013), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/ 
pdf/overview.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
renewables to largely decarbonise electricity genera-
tion by 2050 and at the same time reduce German 
emissions by 80 percent compared to the figure for 
1990.43 Renewables should then account for 80 per-
cent of electricity generation.44 
In 2012 and 2013 the introduction of the energy 
transition caused greenhouse gas emissions in Ger-
many to rise, mainly due to coal consumption.45 
 
43  Erik Gawel et al., “Die Zukunft der Energiewende in 
Deutschland”, Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen 64, no. 4 (April 
2014): 37–44, http://www.et-energie-online.de/Zukunftsfragen/ 
tabid/63/NewsId/914/Die-Zukunft-der-Energiewende-in-
Deutschland.aspx (accessed 28 October 2015); Agora Energie-
wende, Das deutsche Energiewende-Paradox: Ursachen und Heraus-
forderungen: Eine Analyse des Stromsystems von 2010 bis 2030 in 
Bezug auf Erneuerbare Energien, Kohle, Gas, Kernkraft und CO2-Emis-
sionen (Berlin, 2014), http://www.agora-energiewende.de/ 
fileadmin/downloads/publikationen/Analysen/Trends_im_ 
deutschen_Stromsektor/Analyse_Energiewende_Paradox_ 
web.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
44  The idea of an energy transition was already discussed in 
the early 1980s: Florentin Krause, Hartmut Bossel and Karl-
Friedrich Müller-Reißmann, Energie-Wende. Wachstum und 
Wohlstand ohne Erdöl und Uran (Frankfurt, 1980). 
45  German CO2 emissions have risen since 2010. In 2013 the 
increase was 1.2 percent. Umweltbundesamt, “Treibhausgas-
ausstoß im Jahr 2013 erneut um 1,2 Prozent leicht gestiegen: 
Kohlestrom erhöht die Emissionen – und gefährdet so das 
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Internationally this fuelled doubts as to whether cli-
mate protection can be compatible with economic 
growth. However, the reasons for the increase in GHG 
emissions are to be found in deficits in the embedding 
and coordination of the energy transition. Neither 
were the energy policy instruments adjusted in time, 
nor was a power production and infrastructure invest-
ment strategy launched, nor was the German policy 
coordinated with the European energy and climate 
policy. The emissions increase stopped after three 
years in 2014, due to a mild winter and increasing 
consumption of renewables.46 
For 2020 Germany has announced a target of reduc-
ing emissions by 40 percent compared to 1990 levels.47 
The gap of 5 to 8 percent identified by the German En-
vironment Ministry in 2014 is to be closed by improv-
ing energy efficiency, regulating the electricity sector, 
and by stipulating action in housing, transport, agri-
culture, waste disposal and industry. A reform of the 
European emissions trading system (EU ETS) is also on 
the agenda.48 After the Paris Agreement, the German 
discussion about whether and how to phase out coal-
based power production altogether has intensified.49 
 
nationale Klimaschutzziel”, press release, 10 March 2014, 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/presse/presseinformationen
/treibhausgasausstoss-im-jahr-2013-erneut-um-12 (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
46  Umweltbundesamt, “UBA’s 2014 Emissions Data Indicates 
Trend Reversal in Climate Protection. Emissions at Lowest Point 
since 2010“, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/press/ 
pressinformation/ubas-2014-emissions-data-indicates-trend-
reversal (accessed 15 January 2016); Agora Energiewende, 
Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: Stand der Dinge 2014: Rückblick 
auf die wesentlichen Entwicklungen sowie Ausblick auf 2015 (Berlin, 
2015), http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/ 
downloads/publikationen/Analysen/Jahresauswertung_2014/
Agora_Energiewende_Jahresauswertung_2014_web.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
47  Julia Repenning, Lukas Emele, Sibylle Braungardt and 
Wolfgang Eichhammer, Klimaschutzszenario 2050: Zusammen-
fassung, Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Um-
welt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (Berlin, 15 
April 2014), 32, http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/2019/2014-604-
de.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
48  Bundesumweltministerium, Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 
2020 (Berlin, 2014), http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/ 
Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Aktionsprogramm_Klimaschutz/
aktionsprogramm_klimaschutz_2020_broschuere_bf.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
49  Climate Action, “Germany to Scrap Coal by 2050”, 15 
December 2015, http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/ 
news/germany_to_scrap_coal_by_2050 (accessed 11 January 
2016). 
From an international perspective the German 
energy transition is unique, but it matters for inter-
national climate policy to the extent that the German 
pathway could demonstrate that economic growth 
and a climate-friendly energy sector are in fact com-
patible with one another. The German project there-
fore encounters great interest in a range of countries. 
Experts from the emerging economies of Brazil, China 
and South Africa see it having great long-term poten-
tial for the German economy and security of supply, 
but regard the model as only partially transferable.50 
 
 
50  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Wahrnehmung der deutschen Ener-
giewende in Schwellenländern: Ergebnisse einer qualitativen Experten-
befragung in Brasilien, China und Südafrika (Berlin, 2013), http:// 
www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_34940-544-1-30.pdf?140403125805 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
 SWP Berlin 
The Paris Agreement 2015:  
Turning Point for the International Climate Regime 
February 2016 
 
 
19 
Before Paris: Priorities of the Four Biggest Emitters 
 
China, the United States, the European Union and 
India top the list of the biggest GHG emitters (see 
Table 1, p. 11, figures for 2012) and have influenced 
directly and indirectly how the climate negotiations 
progressed in 2015 – be it by virtue of their positions 
as leading regional powers or by taking a leading role 
for a negotiating group such as the G77.51 The Euro-
pean Union, for example, championed the interests of 
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), above all those 
of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). China 
and India are members of the Like-Minded Developing 
Countries on Climate Change (LMDC), and traditional-
ly also represent the interests of the G77. The UNFCCC 
encompasses a multitude of other groups that often 
meet informally to advance particular objectives in 
the talks.52 
The U.S. Took the Lead 
In 2009 in Copenhagen the United States announced 
it would reduce its GHG emissions by 17 percent by 
2020, compared to 2005 levels. After failing to get a 
climate bill through the Senate in 2009, U.S. President 
Barack Obama launched a new climate agenda in 2013, 
leveraging the Clean Air Act of 1970. Climate change 
now became the focus of growing attention in the 
United States and was stimulated inter alia by the third 
joint climate report by a group of thirteen federal 
agencies, warning of the consequences of climate 
change for the United States in May 2014.53 
With foreign policy initiatives in 2014 and 2015, 
Washington took decisive steps in setting the stage for 
 
51  Other key actors include Russia, Brazil, Mexico, South 
Africa and various countries that also represent the climate 
interests of their region, for example the Philippines, Indo-
nesia, Egypt, Colombia and Chile. 
52  “Infographic: Mapping Country Alliances at the Inter-
national Climate Talks”, Carbon Brief Blog, 10 December 2014, 
http://www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/12/infographic-mapping- 
country-alliances-at-the-international-climate-talks/ (accessed 
28 October 2015); AOSIS, http://aosis.org (accessed 28 October 
2015). 
53  US Global Change Research Program, Advance Global Change 
Science, http://www.globalchange.gov/what-we-do/advance-
global-change-science (accessed 28 October 2015). 
the UNFCCC process. Secretary of State John Kerry’s 
engagement in China brought a breakthrough in No-
vember 2014: for the first time the two biggest global 
emitters jointly announced the climate targets they 
intended to pursue after 2020. Washington notified its 
post-2020 climate target (INDC) to the UNFCCC on 3 
March 2015. By 2025 the United States plans to reduce 
its emissions by 26 to 28 percent compared 2005 lev-
els.54 Also, President Obama sought to cooperate simi-
larly with India. In 2015 his engagement has had a 
growing impact on the preparations for the Paris con-
ference. 
In view of the elections in November 2016 and a 
new president taking office in January 2017, Obama is 
forging ahead. The more measures already initiated, 
the stronger the criticism to which a potential Repub-
lican president would be exposed if he sought to re-
verse them.55 Before Paris, the key issue was to further 
national legislation on climate protection to increase 
the chances of President Obama signing an interna-
tional agreement via his executive authority. For the 
current Administration, Congress was the limiting 
factor in the 2015 climate talks.56 An international 
treaty like the Kyoto Protocol would not find the 
necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate. Wishing 
to bypass Congress, Obama was pushing for the agree-
ment in Paris to adopt a legal form that requires only 
the President’s signature. The only option for the U.S. 
ratifying is the “presidential executive agreement”, 
 
54  UNFCCC, INDCs as Communicated by Parties (see note 34). 
55  Erica Martinson, “EPA Carbon Proposal Faces Major 
Hurdles”, Politico, 2 November 2014, http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2014/06/epa-carbon-proposal-global-warming-climate-
107348.html (accessed 28 October 2015). 
56  Susanne Dröge and Sonja Thielges, New Climate Leadership: 
“Yes We Can ... After All” – the United States Is Caught between Inter-
national Ambitions and Domestic Challenges, SWP Comments 34/ 
2014 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2014); 
see also Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Q&A: EPA 
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Power Plants, 
(Arlington, VA, n.d.), http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/ 
epa/q-a-regulation-greenhouse-gases-existing-power (accessed 
28 October 2015); Kyle Danish, Stephen Fotis, Ilan Gutherz, 
Avi Zevin, and Gabriel Tabak, EPA Issues Proposed Clean Power 
Plan to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Power Plants 
(N.p.: Van Ness Feldman, LLP, 2 November 2014), http://www. 
vnf.com/2929 (accessed 28 October 2015). 
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which falls under the President’s constitutional 
foreign policy powers. It applies only if the Paris 
Agreement is in accord with existing U.S. law and 
can be implemented under existing legislation.57 
The cornerstones of the U.S. position have not 
in fact fundamentally changed since Copenhagen. 
International cooperation and support for the 
UNFCCC process are building blocks of the Climate 
Action Plan, which continues the strategy already 
applied successfully in 2009 at the Copenhagen 
climate summit:58 voluntary reduction targets, tech-
nological solutions for reducing emissions, bilateral 
cooperation with emerging economies and developing 
countries, forest conservation, transparency, and 
action on so-called “short-lived climate pollutants” 
(such as black carbon and ozone). Energy efficiency 
and “clean” energy (including gas and nuclear) are 
regarded as important levers for cooperation on cli-
mate protection. 
Any decision on funding international climate 
policy, however, must be made by Congress in the scope 
of the budget negotiations, which continue into 2016. 
In the course of the Paris talks, President Obama could 
therefore only announce that the United States in-
tended to participate in funding global climate policy, 
including by bilateral channels.59 
China: Economic Uncertainty Hindered 
International Commitment 
Beijing announced in November 2014 that it wanted 
to achieve its peak year of absolute CO2 emissions 
by 2030 and thereafter reverse the trend. Although 
Washington pressed for an earlier target, the Chinese 
leadership declined on account of the great uncertain-
ty in its growth forecasts. A second reason why a de-
pendable statement about the development of Chinese 
 
57  Daniel Bodansky, Legal Options for U.S. Acceptance of a New 
Climate Change Agreement, C2ES Brief (Arlington, VA, 2015), 
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/in-brief-legal-options-us-
acceptance-new-climate-change-agreement.pdf (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
58  Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Summary: Copen-
hagen Climate Summit http://www.c2es.org/international/ 
negotiations/cop-15/summary (accessed 28 October 2015); 
White House, The President’s Climate Action Plan 2013 (see note 40). 
59  Suzanne Goldenberg, “White House Unveils $34m Cli-
mate Plan to Disaster-Proof Developing Countries”, Guardian, 
9 November 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2015/jun/09/white-house-climate-plan-developing-countries 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
GHG emissions is not possible is that industrial struc-
tural reforms are overdue.60 Nevertheless China’s 
growth will most likely be associated with further 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and per-capita 
emissions are therefore likely to increase.61 
The question of the peak year and trend reversal 
has been frequently and hotly debated in China in the 
context of the international climate negotiations.62 
Reductions in coal consumption and/or new utilisa-
tion methods are equally controversial.63 Delays in 
implementation arise above all at the local level, where 
control is also lacking. Moreover, the conflicting goals 
that exist between the drive for growth and urbanisa-
tion on the one side and sustainability and environ-
mental protection on the other have not been 
resolved.64 
In the 2015 negotiations under the UNFCCC Beijing 
has operated above all in the context of the usual in-
terest groups (the G77), but made early commitments 
on the international stage from which it traditionally 
shies away. After the bilateral talks with the United 
States at the beginning of 2014, China agreed to sup-
port a new climate agreement and to announce its 
peak year at an early stage.65 Well before the climate 
summit in Paris it announced its climate target and 
notified the INDCs to the UNFCCC on 30 June 2015, 
including 2030 as “peak year”.66 Despite growing eco-
nomic problems since mid-2015, the Chinese govern-
ment has announced its decision to start national emis-
sions trading from 2017, and to contribute US$3.1 bil-
 
60  Neil Gough, “For Chinese Economy, Strengths Are Now 
Weaknesses”, New York Times, 11 March 2015, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/03/12/business/international/for-chinese-
economy-steel-goes-from-strength-to-weakness.html (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
61  CAIT, cited in: Wang et al., “China’s Carbon Mitigation 
Strategies” (see note 26), 51. 
62  Wang et al., “China’s Carbon Mitigation Strategies” (see 
note 26); according to scenarios prepared by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA): 2035, 2030 or already in the course of 
the 2020s. 
63  Dröge and Wacker, China’s Approach to International Climate 
Policy (see note 25); “China Confronts Its Coal Problem”, New 
York Times, 16 August 2014; Chris Buckley, “China’s Plan to 
Limit Coal Use Could Spur Consumption for Years”, New York 
Times, 24 July 2014. 
64  Wang et al., “China’s Carbon Mitigation Strategies” 
(see note 26). 
65  National Development and Reform Commission, “U.S.-
China Joint Statement on Climate Change”, press release, 
Beijing, 15 February 2014, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/ 
201402/t20140218_579304.html (accessed 28 October 2015). 
66  UNFCCC, INDCs as Communicated by Parties (see note 34). 
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lion for funding climate policy through the GCF (see 
“Financing Climate Policy”, pp. 27f.).67 Also shortly 
before the Paris summit there was a demonstration of 
unity between François Hollande and Xi Jinping, the 
French and Chinese presidents, who laid out in detail 
what they expected of the new climate regime in a 
Joint Presidential Statement.68 
India: Moving towards the 
International Regime? 
In the international climate negotiations India has 
in the past operated in an erratic manner, but always 
heel-dragging. India has always been a strong pro-
ponent of a climate policy shaped by the CBDR&RC 
principle (see “The Paris Climate Summit”, pp. 23ff.). 
Persistently, the Indian negotiators argued for the 
industrial countries to lead the way. Since the develop-
ing countries suffer from poverty and are not respon-
sible for historical GHG emissions, India insisted no 
climate targets should be fixed for them.69 Although 
India increasingly sees itself as a global actor, it insists 
on its status as a developing country and absolutely 
rejects any external interference. In the light of its 
growing share of global GHG emissions (see Figs 3 and 
4, p. 15), however, it is essential to demand from India 
an active role and responsibility in the new climate 
regime. 
The country’s willingness to cooperate in inter-
national climate policy has picked up since 2015.70 
Modi’s first step, in response to U.S. overtures, has 
been to implement the 1986 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, which is a 
substantial contribution to global climate protection. 
 
67  Joachim Wille, “Chinas Sensation”, Frankfurter Rundschau, 
1 October 2015; Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Coral Davenport, 
“China to Announce Cap-and-Trade Program to Limit Emis-
sions”, New York Times, 24 September 2015. 
68  “China and France Joint Presidential Statement on Cli-
mate Change (Beijing, 2 November 2015)”, France Diplomatie, 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/ 
climate/2015-paris-climate-conference-cop21/article/china-
and-france-joint-presidential-statement-on-climate-change-
beijing-02-11 (accessed 6 November 2015). 
69  Susanne Dröge and Christian Wagner, India’s Position in 
International Climate Negotiations: No Shift under Modi, SWP Com-
ments 14/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
March 2015). 
70  “Govt Advisor Urges Full Revamp of India’s UN Climate 
Talks Strategy – Media”, Carbon Pulse, 12 August 2015, http:// 
carbon-pulse.com/govt-advisor-urges-full-revamp-of-indias-un-
climate-talks-strategy-media/ (accessed 28 October 2015). 
On 1 October 2015, Delhi submitted its INDCs: by 2030 
40 percent of its electricity demand is to be supplied 
by renewables while the emissions intensity per unit 
of GDP is to be cut by 35 percent. Contrary to previous 
announcements, India is not making its INDCs con-
tingent on financial contributions from the industrial-
ised countries.71 Thus, it is supporting – if hesitantly – 
the emergence of the new climate regime and meeting 
the demand for the emerging economies to partici-
pate in climate protection. 
The European Union: 
Host, Driver, Role Model 
As in 2009, when Denmark held the COP15, an EU 
member state was the host of the Conference of 
Parties in 2015. The European Union and France had 
to satisfy three demands: Firstly, as the third-largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases itself, to make a meaning-
ful contribution to reducing GHG emissions; secondly, 
to ensure the negotiations were a success by skilfully 
mediating between parties pursuing diverging inter-
ests; secondly; and thirdly to advance as such the con-
clusion of an agreement. 
The European Union notified its INDC to the 
UNFCCC in March 2015. By 2030 it plans to cut green-
house gas emissions by at least 40 percent compared 
to 1990.72 The Council conclusions on the EU mandate 
for COP21 reiterated this target.73 
However, the European Union’s role as driving 
force in the negotiations was no longer as pronounced 
as it was for Copenhagen. Whereas in 2009 the Euro-
pean Union entered the Copenhagen talks with a pack-
age of legislation already adopted, in 2015 there was 
no decision taken on the implementation of the 2030 
climate target. Neither did the European Council prom-
ise to increase its targets in the event of a successful 
Paris Agreement, as it had in 2007.74 Many northern 
 
71  UNFCCC, INDCs as Communicated by Parties (see note 34). 
72  Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
Submission by Latvia and the European Commission on Behalf of the 
European Union and Its Member States, Riga, 6 March 2015, http:// 
ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/2015030601_eu_indc_en.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2015). 
73  Council of the European Union, “EU Position for the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Paris: Council Conclusions”, 
press release, 18 September 2015, http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/09/18-counclusions-un-
climate-change-conference-paris-2015/ (accessed 28 October 2015). 
74  Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Coun-
cil, 14 December 2007, Presidency Conclusions” (Brussels, 
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and western member states are open to an upward 
correction and emphasise that 40 percent should 
be seen as the minimum. But numerous central and 
eastern European states want to prevent any increase 
in ambitions. The decisions of the European Council 
will be revisited in 2018 the latest (following the Paris 
Agreement’s decision 20 on stocktaking).75 
Altogether the EU position on the character of 
the new global agreement had converged with the 
realities of the UNFCCC process in 2015, with the 
European Council not following the Commission’s 
proposal to seek a “protocol” in Paris (the strongest 
option under international law). The Council Decision 
of September 2015 speaks of “the importance of 
agreeing […] an ambitious and durable legally-binding 
agreement under the UNFCCC”.76 
Nevertheless, the European Union and its member 
states were heavily committed to make Paris a diplo-
matic success, for example by insisting on post-2020 
climate policy ambitions by the developed countries – 
a view shared by many developing countries – and 
to raise adequate climate financing. As such, already 
before the COP21 the European Union generated 
expectations among its international partners that in 
2016 and thereafter new legislation for implementing 
climate targets will be passed rapidly and financial 
commitments will be met. 
 
 
 
14 February 2008); 1661671/07 REV 1; http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2015) 
75  European Commission, A Policy Framework for Climate and 
Energy in the Period 2020 to 2030, COM(2014) 15 final (Brussels, 
22 January 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ 
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN (accessed 28 Oc-
tober 2015). 
76  Council of the European Union, “EU Position for the UN 
Climate Change Conference in Paris” (see note 72), item 4. 
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The Paris Climate Summit 2015: 
Fundamentals and Elements of the New Regime 
 
Since 2009 the UNFCCC process has prepared for a 
regime change: the global burden-sharing approach 
to mitigation was abandoned, and under the princi-
ples of the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
of 1992 a new direction was taken for reconciling 
interests around responsibilities and capacities for 
climate change policy. Components of the new regime 
have been elaborated at the annual Conferences of 
the Parties (COPs), including the long-term two degree 
target, an increasing adaptation agenda, the Green 
Climate Fund, the INDCs, and the recognition that 
loss and damage are associated with climate change. 
In this section the principles of the UNFCCC are 
outlined, the importance of the Kyoto Protocol illus-
trated and finally the components of the newly adopted 
post-2020 Paris Agreement explained. 
The Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
was adopted in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and came into 
force in 1994. By 2015 195 states (196 parties) had rati-
fied.77 The objective of the UNFCCC is “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” (Article 2, 
UNFCCC).78 
The fundamental principles for climate action and 
burden-sharing are laid out in Article 3. The principle 
of fairness is spelled out in Article 3.1 as “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabili-
ties” (CBDR&RC), and is decisive for burden-sharing 
rules. Article 3.2 stipulates a specific status for those 
developing countries that are especially affected by 
climate change: 
 
77  195 member states plus the European Union. See UNFCCC, 
Status of Ratification of the Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_ 
background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631. 
php; see also UNFCCC, Background on the UNFCCC: The Inter-
national Response to Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/essential_ 
background/items/6031.php (both accessed 2 November 2015). 
78  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
The specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties, especially those that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change, and of those Parties, especially 
developing country Parties, that would have to bear 
a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the 
Convention, should be given full consideration.79 
Article 3.3 names precaution and cost-efficiency as 
additional principles. 
Following the CBDR&RC principle an Annex cat-
egorises the parties. Annex I lists the industrialised 
and transition countries. Parties not listed in Annex I 
are the developing countries (Non-Annex I). The OECD 
countries in Annex I form another group (Annex II) 
that is obligated to supply the financial resources for 
global climate policy. To date there is no further sub-
division of parties to the UNFCCC. 
Emissions Reductions: 
From the Kyoto Protocol to INDCs 
In order to achieve the objective formulated in UNFCCC 
Article 2 (stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions), 
the parties to the UNFCCC negotiated the Kyoto Proto-
col and signed it in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol came 
into force in 2005 following ratification by Russia, and 
192 parties had ratified by 2015. The Kyoto Protocol 
follows the approach of multilateral environmental 
agreements of the 1990s, which was to resolve a spe-
cific global environmental problem, in this case exces-
sive emissions of greenhouse gases, through inter-
national cooperation under a legally binding treaty. 
Under the Protocol the industrialised and transition 
countries agreed to reduce emissions of six green-
house gases.80 The reduction commitments came in 
 
79  Ibid. 
80  The six greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2, serves 
as reference value), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (laughing 
gas, N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). They are quantified as CO2 
equivalents. See Kyoto-Protokoll, Annex A, 1997, http://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html (accessed 28 October 
2015). 
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24 
two periods. The decision on the second commitment 
period, extending through to 2020, was made in Doha 
(Qatar) in 2012 and is currently undergoing the ratifi-
cation process in those states that are still pursuing 
reduction targets.81 
Following the logic of the CBDR&RC principle, the 
classification of UNFCCC states as Annex I (industrial-
ised and transition countries) and Non-Annex I states 
(developing countries) was maintained in the Kyoto 
Protocol (Annex B). The targets were negotiated by 
all parties to the UNFCCC, including the developing 
countries and emerging economies. 
However, already in 1997 the United States was 
highly critical about the lack of obligations for devel-
oping countries. In March 2001, the Administration of 
President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. from the 
Kyoto process altogether. Canada followed in 2011. 
In its assessment reports, the IPCC repeatedly stated 
that the industrialised countries needed to reduce 
their emissions by between 25 and 40 percent by 2020 
(compared to 1990 levels) if average global warming 
was to be limited to a maximum of two degrees.82 The 
commitments in the first Kyoto period (2008–2012) 
amounted to a reduction of just 5.2 percent vis-à-vis 
1990, with different targets for individual states listed 
in Annex B. Consequently, the targets for the Annex I 
countries would have had to increase sharply in the 
second period. However, when the second commit-
ment period (for 2013–2020) was adopted at the end 
of 2012, again some countries (including Japan and 
Russia) withdrew their support. Apart from the EU-28 
and its member states, the current Annex B lists only 
Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and Ukraine.83 Their 
 
81  UNFCCC, „Status oft he Doha Amendment“, as of 21st 
December 2015, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_ 
amendment/items/7362.php (accessed 15 January 2016); 
Oliver Geden, Die Implementierung der “Kyoto-II”-Verpflichtungen 
in EU-Recht: Enger werdende Spielräume für eine klimapolitische 
Vorreiterrolle Deutschlands, SWP-Aktuell 69/2013 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2013). 
82  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emis-
sions Gap Report: Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to 
Limit Global Warming to 2° C or 1.5° C? A Preliminary Assessment, 
Technical Summary (Nairobi, 2010), http://www.unep.org/ 
publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/pdfs/EMISSIONS_GAP_ 
TECHNICAL_SUMMARY.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015); UNEP, 
The Emissions Gap Report 2014: A UNEP Synthesis Report (Nairobi, 
November 2014), http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/ 
emissionsgapreport2014/portals/50268/pdf/EGR2014_HIGHRES. 
pdf (accessed 20 September 2015). 
83  Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: Article 1: Amendment 
A: Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_ 
emission reductions commitments add up to at least 
18 percent by 2020 (compared to 1990), but represent 
a global share of less than 15 percent.84 
The Kyoto Protocol: Impact and Legacy 
The Kyoto Protocol represents the most binding option 
under international law. All states that have ratified 
it are obliged to implement the negotiated targets by 
taking national policy measures, report regularly to 
the UNFCCC and ensure verifiable recording of their 
territorial greenhouse gas emissions. Such a global cli-
mate regime comes closest to the idea of a coordinated 
and controlled reduction in global emissions. How-
ever, shrinking participation in the second commit-
ment period and the inflexible division of the world 
into two groups of countries suggested that this type 
of global agreement is not a viable model, as do the 
inadequately small reduction targets for the Annex I 
countries. 
Nevertheless the Kyoto Protocol has also had very 
positive effects that are of importance for the new 
regime. In a number of countries, above all the Euro-
pean Union, it has inspired climate policy. Its “flexible 
mechanisms” (emissions trading, the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and Joint Implementation), which 
allow for trading of certified emission reductions, 
have brought forth both national and international 
CO2 markets and ensured the emergence of a price 
for GHG emissions.85 
Moreover, the developing countries regard the 
Kyoto Protocol as a manifestation of the historical 
responsibility of the industrialised countries for global 
greenhouse gas emissions. They demanded that this 
responsibility should carry over into the Paris Agree-
ment, in particular the INDCs, with the industrialised 
 
protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf 
(accessed 28 October 2015); World Bank Ecofys, Mapping Car-
bon Pricing Initiatives: Developments and Prospects 2013 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2013), 19. 
84  UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Doha Amendment, http://unfccc. 
int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (accessed 10 November 
2015), Romain Morel and Igor Shishlov, Ex-post Evaluation of 
the Kyoto Protocol: Four Key Lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement, Cli-
mate Report 44 (cdc climat research, May 2014), http://www. 
cdcclimat.com/IMG/pdf/14-05_climate_report_no44_-_analysis_ 
of_the_kp-2.pdf (accessed 10 November 2015). 
85  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), Climate and Carbon: Aligning Prices and Policies, 
OECD Environment Policy Paper 1 (Paris, 2013). 
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countries making a larger contribution than the 
emerging and developing economies. 
The COP20 in 2014 in Lima again confirmed the 
need to set higher targets before 2020 as the second 
Kyoto period does not deliver enough ambition.86 
However, progress has been held back by the search 
for a new post-2020 climate regime. In particular the 
introduction of the INDCs in Warsaw in 2013, which 
all 195 participating states were supposed to submit to 
the UNFCCC by March 2015, had the effect of focusing 
national processes more on this long term climate 
policy agenda than on short-term ambitions. 
Ultimately, the Kyoto Protocol’s second commit-
ment period has become the transition phase from 
the “top down” mitigation approach to the “bottom 
up” approach of the Paris Agreement for the post-2020 
period, characterised by comprehensive pledges, 
reviews and means of implementation. 
Broadening the Mandate for a New Regime: 
From a Bali Action Plan to the ADP 
In 2007 the Bali Action Plan was adopted with a man-
date to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere through a more comprehensive 
agreement. The mandate was also to include in the 
negotiations countries without a mitigation commit-
ment under the Kyoto Protocol. The Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action began nego-
tiations on long-term emissions reductions, adapta-
tion to climate change, financial and technology trans-
fers, and a shared long-term vision.87 The objective was 
to prepare an agreement for adoption by 2009. 
But after this failed at the Copenhagen summit in 
2009, it was not until 2011 in Durban that a new inte-
grated negotiating format was set up: the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP). Its task was to draft a new agreement to 
come into effect from 2020. The legal form of such an 
 
86  UNFCCC, Lima Call for Climate Action. Decision 1/CP.20, http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2 
(accessed 28 October 2015); on ADP and Workstream 2 see 
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php#ws2 (accessed 28 Octo-
ber 2015). 
87  International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD), “Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Conference: 
11–23 November 2013”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12, no. 594 
(26 November 2013): 1, http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/ 
enb12594e.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
agreement was left open.88 It could be “a protocol, 
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with 
legal force” under the UNFCCC applying to all partici-
pating states.89 
The core of the future agreement was concretised 
in Warsaw in 2013: instead of commitments and a top-
down approach to allocation of mitigation action, there 
should be contributions which are “intended” and “na-
tionally determined” (INDCs).90 These contributions 
were not restricted to mitigation measures. As there 
was no guideline or blueprint, countries could submit 
various national climate policy measures and targets. 
This also strengthened the interests of the developing 
countries that wanted to place greater weight on adap-
tation measures, loss and damage, and financial and 
technological support, which they could include in 
their INDCs. 
Adaptation to Climate Change 
Since 2009 many developing countries have felt a 
growing need to identify climate change impacts and 
to call for international assistance in addressing them 
(see Fig. 1, p. 7).91 Climate policy has become a part 
of development cooperation, and adapting to the con-
sequences of climate change and providing funds have 
become core concerns in the negotiations on a new 
comprehensive global agreement. Thus the consensus 
on a new regime was only possible if these concerns 
were recognised to be equally important as the need 
for mitigation. 
Adaptation to climate change is understood as 
activities aiming to minimise the negative repercus-
sions of global warming on people and the natural 
environment.92 In view of the increasing frequency of 
 
88  UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seven-
teenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, 
15 March 2012, therein: Decision 1/CP.17: Establishment of an Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 
11 December 2011, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/ 
cop17/eng/09a01.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
89  Ibid. 2; decision 2/CP.17 2. 
90  IISD, “Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Confer-
ence” (see note 87), 2. 
91  The World Bank supplies comprehensive country pro-
files listing adaptation needs and measures, http://sdwebx. 
worldbank.org/climateportal/index.cfm?page=climate_ 
country_adaptation (accessed 28 October 2015). 
92  The IPCC defines adaptation as the “process of adjustment 
to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human sys-
tems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit 
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extreme weather events, as listed for example by the 
IPCC in its latest assessment report in 2014, address-
ing the topic had become increasingly urgent. 
The potential measures to address climate change 
impacts are very diverse. They include responses to 
extreme weather events, but in the longer term also 
to rising sea levels, land loss, material damage, supply 
risks and other vulnerabilities. The consequences of 
climate change can be ameliorated, for example, by 
adapting land and water use (settlement, management 
of rivers and coasts, access to fresh water). According 
to the IPCC, the different degrees of national vulner-
ability are based not only on geographical features, 
but above all on factors that have nothing to do with 
climate change. The report lists intersecting socio-
economic factors including income, health conditions, 
ethnicity, age and actual exposure to the impacts. 
Countries with multidimensional inequalities and 
uneven development are especially affected to the 
extent that they are both highly vulnerable and lack 
resources for adaptation.93 
Even if adapting to climate change is a global chal-
lenge, there is no uniform solution or set of recom-
mendations for action as is the case for mitigation. 
Rather, the differences in local conditions demand 
conceptions and action at the local, national and 
regional level, often in combination with sectoral 
strategies, such as agricultural techniques. This im-
plies that climate policy will gain further importance 
for the international development agenda and bi-
lateral development cooperation. 
UNFCCC negotiations only started to include adap-
tation measures after more than ten years. A first low-
level debate started in 2005 with the “Convention Dia-
logue” on longer-term issues of climate policy.94 In 
2007 the adoption of the Bali Action Plan placed adap-
tation on the UNFCCC agenda alongside mitigation.95 
 
beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human 
intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate 
and its effects. IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers, Fifth Assessment 
Report, Working Group II (2014), 5, http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/ 
images/uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_SPM_Approved.pdf (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
93  Ibid., 6. 
94  IISD, “Summary of the Warsaw Climate Change Confer-
ence” (see note 87): 2. 
95  Susanne Dröge, ed., International Climate Policy: Priorities of 
Key Negotiating Parties, SWP Research Paper 2/2009 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2010), 13. 
An Adaptation Framework (CAF) was agreed in 2010 
as an outcome of the negotiations in Cancún.96 It spe-
cifies that adaptation must be addressed with the same 
priority as mitigation and should be designed to 
reduce vulnerability to climate change impacts as well 
as strengthen the resilience of affected countries. The 
Adaptation Committee is responsible for implement-
ing CAF measures under the UNFCCC. Regional and 
national institutional structures are to be strength-
ened or created. The focus is on the immediate needs 
of developing countries.97 
The actual adaptation demand of most of the 
UNFCCC parties is clearly reflected in their INDCs. 
At least one hundred of the INDCs assessed by the 
UNFCCC Secretariat contain adaptation measures.98 
The INDCs thus supply, for the first time, an overview 
of the climate-related challenges faced by developing 
countries and could be useful for fine-tuning the devel-
opment cooperation with the OECD donor countries. 
Loss and Damage from Climate Change 
The IPCC describes loss and damage as the “limits to 
adaptation”.99 Above all small island states and coastal 
cities must assume that lower-lying parts of their ter-
ritories will become completely flooded if sea levels 
continue to rise (so-called “slow onset events”). Some 
countries will have no alternative to emigration in 
response to loss of territory. Other poor states, too, 
will be forced to evaluate whether they can adapt to 
all the changes or whether there are losses and dam-
age that cannot be averted through financial assis-
tance or technical intervention. The vulnerable coun-
tries therefore demanded that short- and long-term 
losses and damage be recognised as a separate nego-
tiating topic under the UNFCCC, instead of being 
 
96  UNFCCC, Cancún Adaptation Framework, https://unfccc.int/ 
adaptation/items/5852.php (accessed 28 October 2015). 
97  UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth 
Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, 
15 March 2011, therein: Decision 1/CP.16: The Cancun Agreements: 
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention, http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
98  UNFCCC, Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (see note 8). 
99  “[They] occur when adaptive actions to avoid intolerable 
risks for an actor’s objectives or for the needs of a system are 
not possible or are not currently available.” IPCC, Climate Change 
2014 (see note 92), 25. 
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subsumed within adaptation.100 Loss and damage is 
covered by the Cancún Adaptation Framework of 
2010. In 2011 in Durban (COP17) a work programme 
was adopted, in Doha in 2012 (COP18) the issue was 
recognised by all participating states, and in 2013 in 
Warsaw (COP19) it was decided to anchor loss and 
damage institutionally under the UNFCCC with an 
as yet undefined mechanism (Warsaw International 
Mechanism, WIM).101 Further actions under the WIM 
are foreseen in 2016.102 The Paris Agreement after 
all includes “loss and damage” in its Article 8 and in 
decisions that lay out further steps.103 
Financing Climate Policy 
In the early days of international climate policy no 
financial means were supplied under UNFCCC. The 
industrialised countries referred to the Global Envi-
ronment Facility (GEF), which was established in 1991 
and supports the implementation of international 
environmental agreements based on voluntary con-
tributions.104 Not until the early 2000s were several 
climate funds established, after demands for support 
became louder: 
 The UNFCCC Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF, 
since 2001, budget: US$333 million as of end of Feb-
ruary 2014) supports various sectoral projects for 
adaptation, policy guidance and technology transfer. 
 
100  Laura Schäfer and Sönke Kreft, Loss and Damage: Roadmap 
to Relevance for the Warsaw International Mechanism, Briefing Paper 
of Germanwatch and Brot für die Welt (Bonn: Germanwatch, 
2014), http://www.germanwatch.org/en/8366 (accessed 28 Oc-
tober 2015). 
101  Ibid., 8, and UNFCCC, “Approaches to Address Loss and 
Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in Devel-
oping Countries Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse 
Effects of Climate Change”, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/ 
workstreams/loss_and_damage/items/6056.php (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
102  UNFCCC, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties: 
Decision 2/CP.20, 2 February 2015, http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a02.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015). 
103  UNFCCC, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/ 
L.9/Rev.1, 12 December 2015, https://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf, decisions 48 to 52 (accessed 
19 January 2016). 
104  Benito Müller and Luis Gomez-Echeverri, The Reformed 
Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC, part 1: Architecture and Gov-
ernance (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, April 
2009), 2, http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/ 
documents/EV45.pdf (acessed 3 November 2015). 
 The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF, since 
2001, budget about US$880 million as of April 
2014) supports the least developed countries in 
implementing National Adaptation Programmes 
of Action (NAPAs). 
 The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) of the World 
Bank support four key developing countries’ cli-
mate policies. 
 The Adaptation Fund (2001) receives revenues from 
international emissions trading under the Kyoto 
Protocol and other sources (such as national contri-
butions).105 Falling revenues from emissions trading 
have left the Adaptation Fund underfinanced (an-
nual shortfalls of US$80 million reported for 2014 
and 2015).106 
The Bali Action Plan of 2007, which called on the 
industrialised countries to provide developing coun-
tries with “adequate, predictable, and sustainable fi-
nancial resources and financial and technical support, 
and the provision of new and additional resources”,107 
marked the beginning of a discussion about broader 
financing of climate policy under the UNFCCC and 
defined the benchmark for reaching agreement on cli-
mate finance in the Paris Agreement. 
According to the OECD, the term “climate finance” 
comprises all public and private financial resources 
mobilised by developed countries (from Annex II of 
the UNFCCC plus voluntary members of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee) that target low-
carbon or climate-resilient development in developing 
countries and emerging economies.108 The funds 
under the UNFCCC financing mechanism (UNFCCC 
Article 11) thus contribute only a proportion, along-
side private and public financial transfers supplied in 
parallel for climate policy programmes and projects 
 
105  UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_ 
and_support/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/ 
3659.php (accessed 28 October 2015). 
106  Ibid. 
107  UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thir-
teenth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007, Addendum, 
Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13 para. 1 (e)(i), FCCC/CP/2007/ 
6/Add.1, 5, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/ 
06a01.pdf (accessed 12 January 2016); UNFCCC, Climate Change: 
Impacts, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation in Developing Countries 
(Bonn, 2007), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/ 
impacts.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015)  
108  OECD, Climate Finance in 2013–14 and the USD 100 Billion 
Goal: A Report by the OECD in Collaboration with Climate Policy 
Initiative (CPI) (Paris, 2015), 10, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/ 
Climate-Finance-in-2013-14-and-the-USD-billion-goal.pdf 
(accessed 12 November 2015). 
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in recipient countries (also including development 
funding). 
In recent years a broader concept of climate finance 
has emerged, encompassing global investment – in-
cluding those within industrialised countries – in tech-
nologies, infrastructure and other capital and referred 
to as “shifting the trillions”.109 Above all, this climate 
finance is intended to bring about an incisive decar-
bonisation and a transformation of energy supply and 
use, resulting in a sharp decline in use of fossil fuels 
and emission-intensive processes. 
The magnitude of the required investments has 
been calculated in various reports, including the 2014 
New Climate Economy Report and the 2015 report by the 
Canfin-Grandjean Commission, but it was not subject 
to the negotiations as such.110 
Current State of Climate Financing under UNFCCC 
The sequence of international negotiations resulted in 
two components for the UNFCCC to determine at the 
COP21 in Paris: 
1. Climate finance pledges until 2020: US$100 billion 
are to be mobilised each year until 2020; 
2. Climate financing after 2020 as part of the Paris 
Agreement. 
In 2009 the industrialised countries promised to 
raise climate finance of US$100 billion annually until 
2020. This sum is based on the calculations of a World 
Bank study, which found that the developing coun-
tries would need an additional US$75 to 100 billion 
 
109  World Bank, “Mobilizing the Billions and Trillions for 
Climate Finance”, 18 April 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/ 
en/news/feature/2015/04/18/raising-trillions-for-climate-
finance (accessed 28 October 2015). 
110  One measure of decarbonisation is the degree to which 
GDP growth becomes separated from the GHG emissions 
trend. See Pascal Canfin and Alain Grandjean, Mobilizing Cli-
mate Finance: A Roadmap to Finance a Low-Carbon Economy, Report 
of the Canfin-Grandjean Commission (Paris, June 2015), http:// 
de.scribd.com/doc/269455753/Mobilizing-Climate-Finance-A-
Roadmap-to-Finance-a-Low-carbon-Economy (accessed 28 
October 2015); Nicolas Stern, “Finance”, in The New Climate 
Economy, (2014), chapt. 6, http://static. newclimateeconomy. 
report/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NCE_Chapter6_Finance. 
pdf (accessed 28 October 2015); Barbara Buchner, Martin 
Stadelmann, Jane Wilkinson, Federico Mazza, Anja Rosenberg 
and Dario Abramskiehn, The Global Landscape of Climate Finance 
2014, Climate Policy Initiative Report, November 2014, v, 
http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/ 
The-Global-Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-2014.pdf (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
annually if they are to adapt to the consequences 
of global warming of up to two degrees Celsius by 
2050.111 In a first step in Copenhagen US$30 billion 
were promised for the period between 2010 and 2012 
(fast start finance),112 but private funds were also to 
be mobilised. 
Assessments of the order of magnitude of funds 
used for climate financing had to rely on estimates. 
There is no standardised method for calculating the 
public and private financial flows. The reports varied 
widely on this point.113 Calculating flows of private 
funds which are not major energy investment projects 
is especially difficult. In October 2015 the OECD pub-
lished the first study proposing a standardised method 
and presenting figures for pre-2020 climate finance. 
According to the report US$61.8 billion were mobi-
lised in 2014. The dynamic increase of almost US$10 
billion compared to 2013 is attributable to the multi-
lateral development banks (see Fig. 7).114 
In contrast to the “100-billion-dollar question”, 
climate finance beyond 2020 was difficult to identify 
and negotiate, but the developing countries expected 
further reliable funds above and beyond the US$100 
billion. However, given that donor countries generally 
require approval from their national parliaments 
before releasing international funding, it was un-
realistic to expect them to promise for any period 
longer than five years. The decisions associated with 
the Paris Agreement stipulate that this process will 
continue, that in 2025 a new sum will be presented 
and that US$100 billion represents the floor for any 
further commitment. 
 
111  World Bank (Hg.), Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change. 
Synthesis Report (Washington, D.C., 2010), xix, http://documents. 
worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/01/16436675/economics-
adaptation-climate-change-synthesis-report (accessed 28 Octo-
ber 2015), and World Bank, The Cost to Developing Countries of 
Adapting to Climate Change: New Methods and Estimates (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2010). 
112  OECD, Financing Climate Change Action: Policy Perspectives 
2014 (Paris, November 2014), 5, http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
239900170/Financing-Climate-Change-2014-Policy-Perspective 
(accessed 3 November 2015). 
113  Especially the OECD and the Climate Policy Initiative 
have reported regularly on climate financing, but their reports 
are largely incompatible. Buchner et al., The Global Landscape of 
Climate Finance 2014 (see note 110), v; OECD, Financing Climate 
Change Action (see note 112), 5 and 15. 
114  OECD, Climate Finance in 2013–14 and the USD 100 Billion 
Goal (see note 108). 
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Figure 7 
Funds mobilised for climate finance in 2013 and 2014, by source (US$ billion) 
*  Attributed to donor countries (developed countries) in the estimates. 
Source: OECD and CPI, Climate Finance in 2013–14 and the USD 100 Billion Goal: A Report by the OECD  
in Collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative (Paris, 2015), 10 (differences result from rounding). 
 
The Green Climate Fund 
The 2009 announcement for climate finance was 
associated with calls for the UNFCCC to operate its 
own fund instead of relying on the GEF and the World 
Bank. In 2010 in Cancún a Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
was introduced to administer climate finance under 
the UNFCCC alongside the GEF. The GCF (based in 
Songdo district in the South Korean city of Incheon) 
has an Executive Board comprising twelve representa-
tives from industrialised countries and twelve from 
developing countries. Thus, recipient countries co-
decide on the distribution of funds. A first package of 
thirty-seven projects was presented in October 2015,115 
and the first eight were approved at the beginning of 
November.116 In the course of setting up the GCF in 
2011, comprehensive reporting obligations for the 
OECD countries (UNFCCC Annex II) were agreed to 
ensure greater transparency with respect to resources 
 
115  “GCF Publishes First Funding Proposals for Board Con-
sideration”, press release, 16 October 2015, http://news. 
gcfund.org/gcf-publishes-first-funding-proposals-for-board-
consideration/, and GCF, Governing Instrument for the Green 
Climate Fund, http://www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/ 
documents/pdf/GCF-governing_instrument-120521-block-
LY.pdf (accessed 19 October 2015). 
116  Green Climate Fund, “Green Climate Fund Approves 
First 8 Investments”, press release, 6 November 2015, http:// 
bit.ly/1MYSfWh (accessed 12 November 2015). 
originating from various funds, multilateral financial 
institutions and bilateral commitments.117 
In order for the GCF to operate, US$10.2 billion 
were required, almost all of which had been pledged 
by the end of 2014.118 In July 2014 Germany, as the 
first major industrialised country, pledged to contrib-
ute US$1 billion by 2020; other states followed. At the 
Petersberg Climate Dialogue in 2015 Germany doubled 
its promised contribution and also pledged to increase 
its development aid by €8.3 billion between 2016 
and 2019.119 China has announced it will contribute 
US$3.1 billion to the GCF (see “China”, pp. 20f.). This 
 
117  UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seven-
teenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 
2011, 15 March 2011, here: Addendum: Part Two: Action Taken 
by the Conference of the Parties at Its Seventeenth Session, http:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf (accessed 
28 October 2015). 
118  GCF, “First Pledging Conference of Green Climate Fund 
Yields Unprecedented US$ 9.3 Billion”, press release, 20 
November 2014, http://www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_ 
customer/documents/Press/GCF_Press_Release_2014_11_20_ 
Berlin_pledges.pdf (accessed 28 October 2015); GCF, “GCF 
Set to Allocate Resources before Paris Climate Change Con-
ference: Board Accredits First Entities”, press release, 26 
March 2015, http://news.gcfund.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/03/GCF_press_release_2015_03_26.pdf (accessed 28 
October 2015). 
119  The [German] Federal Government, “Germany Increases 
Funding for Climate Action”, 19 May 2015, http://www. 
bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2015/05_en/2015-05-
19-rede-merkel-pkd_en.html (accessed 30 November 2015). 
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support from emerging economies is now part of the 
Paris Agreement (Article 9) on a voluntary basis. 
Given that the total of US$100 billion annually will 
not be mobilised from public sources alone, the GCF 
will set up conditions for projects and programmes 
in such a way as to encourage private investment in 
climate protection and adaptation. However, the prior-
ities of the donor and recipient countries continue to 
diverge. The donors regard the GCF as an institution 
that advances climate protection and make a contri-
bution to closing the emissions gap by 2020. The 
developing countries, especially the LDCs and small 
island states, want above all to finance adaptation 
measures through the GCF. There is also debate over 
the financial tools. The funds could for example be 
used to leverage private investment through specific 
loans or loan guarantees. The developing countries 
view this critically, expecting that only a few major 
companies would be able to benefit. They also still 
highlight that most climate finance will not be addi-
tional, but will be part of existing official development 
assistance budgets.120 
The Paris Agreement 2015 
The Paris outcome agreed on 12 December 2015 con-
sists of two key components:121 
 A Paris Agreement securing a binding framework 
for climate policy after 2020. The Paris Agreement 
is an annex to the adopted document, but is actually 
the core achievement and point of reference for 
climate policy after 2020. 
 Various COP21 decisions (140 in total) lay out a 
workplan for the immediate way forward under the 
UNFCCC, both for details not elaborated in the Paris 
Agreement text and for climate policy action before 
2020. 
The Paris Agreement has three purposes: limiting 
the global average temperature increase, improving 
adaptation abilities, and securing consistent finance 
flows for both challenges. It includes the following 
building blocks:122 
 
120  Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN), 
Framing a Long-Term Response to Climate Finance. What Can We 
Expect the Green Climate Fund to Deliver? SDSN Germany Round 
Table Summary Report (Berlin, 20 November 2014). 
121  UNFCCC, Adoption of the Paris Agreement (see note 5). 
122  Also Jennifer Morgan, Yamide Dagnet and Dennis Tirpak, 
Elements and Ideas for the 2015 Paris Agreement: Executive Summary, 
WRI Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: WRI, November 2014), 
1.  Integration and progression of the INDCs and 
related support for developing countries (Articles 3 
and 4). All parties are to prepare, communicate and 
maintain “nationally determined contributions” 
(NDCs) that they intend to achieve, and shall pursue 
domestic mitigation measures. Each new announce-
ment of an NDC has to go beyond the current NDC 
(progression) and ambition should be the highest 
possible, taking into account the CBDR&RC principle. 
A five-year cycle is established in Article 4.9 and a com-
mon timeframe will be set by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement (CMA) at its first session. In order to make 
the NDCs as reliable as possible, the parties are invited 
to submit related long-term development strategies 
from 2020 onwards. 
2.  A long-term goal for mitigation. The agreement’s 
Article 2 determines as its purpose holding the global 
average temperature rise at “well below 2 degrees” 
and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels. In order to achieve these 
targets, two options were discussed: “decarbonisation” 
by the end of the century, as agreed by the G7 at the 
June 2015 summit, or – in line with the IPCC’s fifth 
assessment report – a net zero target (climate neutral-
ity), to be achieved in the second half of the century. 
The latter made it into the text. Article 4.1 sets the aim 
of peaking emissions “as soon as possible” and rapid 
reductions thereafter, again with reference to CBDR&RC. 
It also refers to the role of science in determining the 
need for emission reductions, and defines carbon 
neutrality as a “balance between anthropogenic emis-
sions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases in the second half of this century”. 
3.  Adaptation to climate change, Loss and Damage. 
The Paris Agreement includes the full range of adap-
tation issues, although in a less specific way than for 
mitigation. Article 7 focuses on three overarching 
ways to achieve better adaptation: enhancing adaptive 
capacities, strengthening resilience and reducing vul-
nerability. It recognises the challenge as being global, 
while its dimensions span from the local up to the 
global level. It highlights the need for finance and 
the trade-off between mitigation and adaptation pres-
sures. It also includes the full set of actions that need 
to be undertaken by a great variety of state and non-
state actors, integrated in a wider socioeconomic and 
environmental policy context. Further details of the 
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adaptation agenda are left to the CMA negotiations, 
to the Adaptation Committee and other expert groups 
(Decisions 42 – 47). Loss and damage is recognised as 
a separate matter in Article 8. Further details will be 
discussed by the Warsaw International Mechanism 
in 2016. Decision 52 specifies that Article 8 does not 
“involve or provide a basis for any liability or com-
pensation” which was a key concern for the U.S. 
4.  Measures to support poor countries: finance, 
technology transfer, and capacity-building are elabo-
rated in Articles 9 to 11. The developed countries are 
obliged to provide financial resources for both miti-
gation and adaptation in developing countries, while 
“other parties” are encouraged to support on a volun-
tary basis. This way the emerging economies’ partici-
pation in support schemes (such as China’s contribu-
tion to the GCF) has also entered the agreement and 
they are invited to continue this path. The quantified 
figures are part of decision 54. The goal of US$100 
billion is prolonged – conditional on creating trans-
parency about purposes and ways the money is being 
spent – while by 2025 a new collective financial goal 
will be set by the CMA, with US$100 billion as the 
floor. Four funds (GCF, GEF, SCCF, LDCF; see also sec-
tion on climate finance above) will serve as trustees 
of the Paris Agreement’s climate finance. 
5.  Stocktaking and regular cycles for future coopera-
tion and transparency. Verification and revision of 
mitigation and financial support are fully integrated 
into the Paris Agreement (NDCs, adaptation, support). 
Review mechanisms help to systematically ensure that 
the parties actually fulfil their NDCs through national 
climate policy measures and deliver the financial con-
tributions. Article 14 sets 2023 as the launch year of a 
five-year cycle in global stocktaking by the CMA. The 
global stocktaking exercise is crosscutting and com-
prises all the purposes of the agreement (mitigation, 
adaptation and support; Article 2). 
The new climate regime established with the Paris 
Agreement has the potential to live up to the chal-
lenge of climate change. Its foundation is the national 
climate policy action undertaken by the parties to the 
UNFCCC, with an interwoven set of procedures through 
which the UNFCCC parties interact regularly to deliver 
transparency, differentiation, review, and monitoring. 
This system is a completely new way to address the 
global challenges around climate change and its in-
centive structures will need further analysis and elabo-
ration. Especially the two surprising topics included, 
one being the mentioning of a 1.5 degree temperature 
goal, another being market and non-market mecha-
nisms (“cooperative approaches”, Article 6), will put 
high demands on future negotiations as both are 
highly contentious for some parties. 
The stocktaking cycles will set the summits on a 
different footing, because the COPs with “ultimate” 
character will become history. Rather the challenge 
will be to maintain the momentum of ambition and – 
in the event that public pressure on the heads of state 
and government wanes in the course of a new routine 
– the need to search for ways to bring them back on 
course. The cycles will bind the parties more strongly 
to the UNFCCC, especially as the new rules for inter-
national cooperation combine financial commitments 
with national deliveries on NDCs and demand more 
transparency from all parties. 
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Conclusions and Next Steps 
 
The Paris climate summit in December 2015 brought 
about a new start for the international post-2020 
climate regime. Elements of the new regime have 
already been agreed in the past six years in the course 
of the UNFCCC negotiations such as the two degrees 
target, the Adaptation Framework, and the founding 
of the Green Climate Fund. 
The success in Paris was also based on a very open 
process where a draft text was only introduced very 
late and where key players had the flexibility to posi-
tion themselves literally until the very end of the 
talks. The willingness of the major players to partici-
pate in shaping climate policy internationally has 
gradually grown during the last years. Here the United 
States has made the most dramatic turnabout, while 
the European Union was reluctant to leave the Kyoto 
model behind and turn to the new concept of volun-
tary commitments. 
The Paris Agreement fits into a broader setting 
decided in 2015. In September, the Agenda 2030 with 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) helped to 
create more trust that the United Nations could act on 
the global challenges by including all relevant actors. 
In particular, the industrialised countries must imple-
ment in Agenda 2030 in the same manner as develop-
ing countries. And with the Paris Agreement, the 
emerging economies that have to date been classed 
as developing countries without obligations in the 
climate regime will after 2020 participate in contain-
ing climate change and tackling its consequences. 
The success of the new agreement will be judged 
in terms of whether it stimulates long-term economic 
and political changes for the parties to the UNFCCC, 
for example by investment flowing increasingly into 
renewables rather than fossil fuels or climate finance 
increasing the willingness to improve transparency in 
climate protection and national policies. 
For 2016, the negotiations will continue under the 
UNFCCC, in particular in order to bring further preci-
sion to the agreement’s clauses. Another update on 
synthesis of INDCs is due on 4 April 2016. A first for-
mal step in the follow-up timetable will be the signa-
ture of the Paris Agreement from 22 April onwards in 
New York. For its entry into force, it must be ratified 
by 55 parties with at least a total share of 55 percent of 
global GHG emissions. While the U.S. president is 
expected to immediately also ratify the agreement, 
other countries’ follow-up hinges on their specific 
domestic ratification procedures. 
The implementation of the Paris Agreement will 
depend on a whole range of factors which will develop 
over time. Short-term trends will interfere, such as the 
steep fall of the oil price in 2016 or a dampened busi-
ness cycle. The attitudes of big emitters to their INDC 
implementations will be connected to the associated 
benefits. In China a rethinking already began at 
national level some time ago: climate protection also 
has short-term benefits for a population suffering 
greatly from local air pollution. India still has a longer 
way to go. But its interest in climate policy is growing 
steadily because of the energy benefits it offers: 
greater security, efficiency and technological progress. 
For Germany and the European Union 2016 will 
bring opportunities for cooperation with these impor-
tant players. Beijing intends to launch its national 
emissions trading scheme already in 2017, for which 
it will require considerable support. Delhi will want to 
advance both the expansion of coal-fired power gen-
eration and a more intensive use of renewables, and 
will welcome support from Germany. 
The INDC submissions of some countries were real-
ised with German support, helping poorer countries 
to set starting points for future development coopera-
tion. The announcement of climate adaptation meas-
ures in more than one hundred INDCs demonstrates 
the priorities of the developing countries in detail and 
could be useful for optimising development strategies. 
For the United States the election year of 2016 will 
severely limit contributions to the UNFCCC agenda. 
Continuation of the cooperation would be conceivable 
in the course of the G20 Presidency, which China holds 
in 2016, followed by Germany in 2017. 
In 2016 the European Union will take legislative 
steps to further the Energy Union, including the effort 
sharing of the 40 percent emissions reduction target 
for 2030. Germany’s role is to press for both reforms of 
the EU emissions trading scheme and the energy policy 
legislation, and to mediate between the western and 
eastern member states. 
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Abbreviations 
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action 
AF Adaptation Fund 
APA Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement 
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States 
CAF Cancún Adaptation Framework 
CAIT Climate Analysis Indicators Tool 
CBDR&RC Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities 
C2ES Center for Climate and Energy Solutions  
(Arlington, VA) 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CIF Climate Investment Funds 
CMA Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CPI Climate Policy Initiative 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ETS Emissions Trading System 
GCF Green Climate Fund 
GEF Global Environment Facility 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
Gt Gigatonne 
IDDRI Institut du développement durable et des relations 
internationales (Paris) 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development 
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LDC Least Developed Countries 
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund 
LMDC Like-Minded Developing Countries on Climate 
Change 
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
MILES Modelling and Informing Low-Emission Strategies 
NAPA National Adaptation Programme of Action 
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation 
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SDSN Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on  
Climate Change 
US$ United States Dollar 
WIM Warsaw International Mechanism 
WRI World Resources Institute (Washington, D.C.) 
